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Twenty years after the collapse of the GDR the situ-
ation in the new Laender has improved greatly:stan-
dards of living for the population have increased sub-
stantially, the capital stock in the business sector has
been modernized, and also the improved environ-
mental situation and the well developed infrastruc-
ture are visible signs for the progress that has been
achieved since 1989.1 Nevertheless, in many fields of
economic performance there are still substantial gaps
between eastern and western Germany. A further
problem is that the convergence of macroeconomic
indicators,such as per capita GDP or productivity,has
been proceeding only slowly for a long time.This rais-
es the question about the causes and the perspectives
for the eastern German economy.Another matter of
interest is the current course of action as well as the
need for action when it comes to economic policies.
The success and the failure of the “Economic
Reconstruction in the East”(Aufbau Ost) are – on an
aggregate level – revealed by a few overall key figures.
The (nominal) GDP per capita is currently just under
71 percent of the average western German value2 – in
1991 it was only 43 percent (cf.Table). In the area of
productivity (measured by the nominal GDP per
hour) the gap is smaller but still large:Eastern German
productivity is currently at 76 percent of the average
western German value.After a substantial rise imme-
diately after reunification there has been almost no ap-
proximation to the western German level since 1997.
Contrary to the development in the early 1990s there
is no longer an effective convergence of economic
prosperity between eastern and western Germany.3
The gap in the economic strength between eastern
and western Germany reflects in particular the struc-
tural differences between the two regions, especially
the diverging size of businesses and the virtual ab-
sence of company headquarters in the new Laender
(DIW et al. 2002, 193ff.) As a result, certain value-
added activities (especially in the area of research and
development) are under-represented in eastern Ger-
many, export orientation is low and economics of
scale induced by larger production series often can-
not be taken advantage of.
Above all,the eastern German economy does not suc-
ceed in generating sufficient income through the sale
of goods and services outside the region; rather, a rel-
atively high proportion of the domestic demand is fi-
nanced by the federal government, the western
German Laender and the social security agencies. In
2005, these transfer payments (after deduction of tax
revenues and social security contributions attributable
to East Germany) reached approximately EUR 70 to
80 billion;one fifth of the domestic demand is financed
by funds from outside East Germany (Blum et al.
2009).In this respect,the economic development in the
new Laender is still not “self-supporting”.
* Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Dresden Branch.
1 For a more detailed comparison of the situation today with the
economic situation in 1989, see Ragnitz, Scharfe and Schirwitz
(2009).
2 Unless otherwise stated, the calculations in this articles refer to
eastern Germany including Berlin and western Germany without
Berlin.
Table
Indicators of the convergence process in eastern
Germany: nominal gross domestic product







1991 42.9 44.5 44.3 
1995 67.1 72.2 65.9 
2000 67.2 75.7 70.1 
2005 69.5 78.6 74.3 
2006 69.9 78.5 74.4 
2007 70.3 78.5 74.9 
2008 70.9 79.0 75.6 
Source: Arbeitskreis VGR der Laender; calculation
by the Ifo Institute.
3 For corresponding calculations for individual federal states, see
also Berthold and Kullas (2009).One consequence of the weak overall economic de-
velopment since the mid-1990s is the unsatisfactory
labor market situation in the new Laender.Although
the unemployment rate dropped from more than 20
percent below 15 percent,it is still twice as high as in
western Germany (7.2 percent in 2008).The decline
in unemployment in recent years is only partly due to
an increase in employment;more important is the de-
cline in labor supply caused by a shrinking working-
age population.
Considering all of this, a significant gap can still be 
observed between eastern and western Germany 
20 years after unification, with no evident signs of a
rapid improvement.What are the reasons for the slow
catching-up process in the new Laender? 
History matters: causes for economic backwardness
In order to explain the deficits of the “economic re-
construction of the east” described in the previous
paragraph, it is necessary to look at the strategic de-
cisions which were taken in the early 1990s. In doing
so, the aim is not to denounce these political deci-
sions. It is not only futile to argue about what could
have been done differently – one also has to consid-
er that many of the decisions at the time had to be
taken under time pressure and without recourse to
historical experiences or access to empirical eco-
nomic research. In this respect, it was inevitable that
developments initiated at the time appear problem-
atic or even counterproductive in retrospective.
It is important to keep in mind the historical back-
ground:In the late autumn of 1989,the GDR was not
only politically, but above all economically, ruined.
The mass protests of 1989 not only mirrored the pop-
ular outrage with regards to the constrictions of per-
sonal and political rights of freedom.Above all it re-
flected the all-around dissatisfaction with the insuffi-
cient supply of goods and services and the overex-
ploitation of the natural environment.The actual sit-
uation was even a lot more dramatic than was known
to the public.The governmental planning authorities
observed in a confidential study in October 1989 that
the GDR was close to insolvency (Schürer et al.
1989).Due to the neglect of capital spending for many
years in favour of private consumption, the capital
stock was to a large extent in a bad state and pro-
duction downtimes were a common occurrence.This
led to a failure to reach the state-established produc-
tion targets. Additionally, the technological efficien-
cy of the eastern German economy and the infra-
structure was not at its best.The authors of the study
concluded that the reconstruction of the eastern
German economy would require the reduction of liv-
ing standards of the people by at least one third,while
introducing free-market elements into the GDR
economy at the same time.
In view of this situation,eastern German enterprises
would not have had a real chance against western
German competitors – even if the conditions of uni-
fication had been more favorable.The situation was
worsened by the politically motivated decision to es-
tablish a currency union between GDR and FRG
with a rate of conversion of 1 Mark to 1 DM (for flow
variables) in return for an almost complete accep-
tance of the western German social market economy.
For eastern German companies this meant the equiv-
alence of a 400 percent upward revaluation,with the
result that products from the GDR were virtually im-
possible to sell abroad.
A lower conversion rate, however, would have pro-
vided only short-term survival:in this case,open bor-
ders and the resulting migration flows would have led
to massive wage increases.The consequences would
have been the same.The only real alternative would
have been the continued existence of two separate
economic areas, which due to obvious political rea-
sons was not a realistic option.
For stock variables (saving accounts of the popula-
tion and company debts) a general exchange rate of
2 GDR marks = 1 DM was decided on (certain spe-
cial rules for private savings applied).The reason for
this was the attempt to skim the eastern German ex-
cess of purchasing power in order to curb inflation-
ary tendencies.The disadvantage was that private fi-
nancial wealth,which was already quite small in East
Germany, was substantially reduced.This led to sev-
eral consequences:firstly,many of the companies that
were set up after the monetary union had only a nar-
row capital base. Secondly, private eastern German
households only had small assets,which has been the
case until today. This has probably added to the in-
creased risk sensitivity of the eastern German econ-
omy (IWH 2009).
The monetary, economic and social union (Wäh-
rungs- Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion), implemented
on 1 July 1990 may – from an economic perspective –
be considered a mistake (Sachverständigenrat 1990),
but the union had the undeniable advantage of ren-
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dering the market-based renewal process in the GDR
irreversible.Possible attempts to implement a step by
step transition were prevented from the very begin-
ning.The price for this was,however,the almost com-
plete collapse of the eastern German economy. The
responsible politicians, misjudging the real situation
of the eastern German enterprises and overestimat-
ing the market-based incentives, accepted that price
because they acted on the assumption of a second
Wirtschaftswunder (Willgerodt 1990). It was only in
the spring of 1991 that politicians realized that the
economic renewal in eastern Germany would need
extensive political support.The introduction of a wide
range of funding policies followed (BMWi 1991).
Even though the take-over of the West German mod-
el of the social market economy was one of the fun-
damental conditions for the rapid reunification of
Germany, in retrospect one has to consider the com-
plete conferment of the West German legal system to
the new Laender more critically.Already in the late
1980s, extensive deregulation measures designed to
strengthen economic dynamics were discussed in
western Germany. Keeping in mind that the eastern
German population was not familiar with the west-
ern German legal system,it would have possibly been
wiser to establish (at least outside the core areas of
the market-based system) a less complex regulation
system in the new Laender. Relaxed regulations for
eastern Germany were allowed only in certain areas
(non-introduction of the trade capital tax, accelerat-
ed planning and approval procedures).Furthermore,
the politically motivated decision to give priority to
the return of private property over payment of com-
pensation led to a massive hindrance to investment
as the relevant claims had to be identified and made
legally binding in a time-consuming process.This led
to the effect that rather than taking over existing com-
panies, investors tended to set up new businesses in
new locations unburdened by old liabilities.It was on-
ly in 1992 that this principle was virtually reversed by
the so-called Investment Priority Act (Investitions-
vorranggesetz;Bundesamt zur Regelung offener Ver-
mögensfragen 2001).
The second great challenge was the transfer of the
state-owned eastern German companies into private
responsibility.This task lay with a newly founded pri-
vatization agency (Treuhandanstalt) which was sup-
posed to privatize the state owned firms as quickly as
possible. If this was not possible, the Treuhandanstalt
could either carry out initial reconstruction measures
or initiate the closing down of companies where the
former made no sense.The Treuhandanstalt managed
to fulfill this task quickly – within only 4 years
14,600 companies and parts of companies were hand-
ed over to new proprietors; for 3,700 companies liq-
uidation was initiated. However, in the case of many
companies,massive financial concessions were neces-
sary in order to find new investors.As a consequence,
the privatization process ended in a total loss of more
than EUR 100 billion.The reason for this was mainly
the hurry with which privatization was pushed and al-
so the fact that due to the wage increases in 1990 and
1991 many companies could only be sold at a loss.
Different privatization strategies, i.e., participation
models, could have possibly prevented the losses of
the Treuhandanstalt (Sinn and Sinn 1992, 133 ff.).
But again there was no real alternative to privatizing
state-owned firms, because it was agreed upon that
their existence was incompatible with a market-based
system. Also, a reconstruction of non-competitive
companies before privatization would probably have
been even more expensive due to a lack of incentives
for an efficient allocation of resources. Furthermore,
this would not have increased the chances of privati-
zation because the course for the future development
of the companies would have been set by public au-
thorities. Nevertheless, the strategy of the Treuhand-
anstalt to dismantle companies prior to privatization
has to be regarded rather critically – especially with
view to the further economic development in eastern
Germany.This strategy was at least partly responsible
for the destruction of existing networks within the giv-
en structures. Also the fact that the Treuhandanstalt
sold most of the companies to investors from western
Germany or abroad must be regarded as a disadvan-
tage (despite the benefits these firms gained by fast ac-
cess to resources via the respective holding company).
In the end this led to a far-reaching heteronomy of the
eastern German industry in the new Laender.And fi-
nally,it cannot be denied that many investors were on-
ly interested in acquiring state-subsidized production
facilities (“extended workbenches”).Elements of the
value added chain that did not fit their respective com-
pany concept were closed down in eastern Germany.
Especially more complex elements of the value added
chain (like sales, administration as well as research
and development) are therefore still under-repre-
sented in eastern Germany today.
A further burden for the economic development in
the new Laender was wage policy. Even though the
initial agreements for a fast harmonization of the
eastern and western German wage system (reachedin expectation of a rapid convergence) were with-
drawn rather quickly;still,the hourly wage in the new
Laender rose – already between 1991 and 1995 – by
about almost 54 percent. In 1991 they reached only
55 percent of the western Germany level, but until
1995 an adjustment to a level of more than 70 percent
was achieved – while the statistically measured pro-
ductivity on an hourly basis reached only 66 percent
of the western German reference value. It does not
come as a surprise that wages that are not in line with
productivity caused many companies to close down
and destroyed jobs,especially in the industrial sector.
Furthermore, this added to a decreasing attachment
to collective labour agreements in the new Laender
– only 25 percent of all companies apply a collective
labour agreement.4While according to WSI5 the offi-
cial wage contracts in eastern Germany have reached
97 percent of the western German standard, the ad-
justment of the effective wages per hour lies only at
78 percent. Unit labour costs which were more than
one quarter above the western German standard at
the beginning, have by now reached the same level.
However,the evaluation of the wage development in
eastern Germany is still ambivalent: even though
wages in eastern Germany are too high to allow for a
higher level of employment,they are at the same time
too low to stop the movement of labour,especially of
young and qualified people.The result is a deteriora-
tion of the human capital base in the new Laender to-
gether with the necessity for high social transfers to
support people unable to find employment in eastern
Germany.
The obvious way out (creating more jobs via state-
subsidized wages; Akerlof et al. 1991) was not pur-
sued, primarily due to regulatory reasons: the pro-
motion of firms should only provide initial funding
and not establish a lasting subsidy. Instead, promo-
tion of economic development was designed – besides
the general improvement of locational conditions in
the new Laender (transport and communication in-
frastructure and housing conditions) – to reduce the
cost of capital substantially.This was supposed to pro-
vide investment incentives and to help relieve the
lack of financial resources in eastern German com-
panies.Furthermore interest-reduced loans,direct in-
vestment support (via investment grants and tax ben-
efits) and special depreciation allowances were pro-
vided.In total,these measures led to a temporary re-
duction of capital costs for industrial investment in
eastern Germany of up to -5 percent.This meant that
even investment projects with a negative rentability
were – due to state subsidies – still worthwhile from
an economic point of view (Sinn 1995).Naturally,this
did not contribute to a long-lasting increase in the
production potential in the new Laender;in fact quite
the opposite is true.It was the cause for the structur-
al adjustments that started in the mid-1990s.Another
result was that despite extensive capital spending on-
ly few new jobs could be created.
As time went by, the malfunctioning of the econom-
ic system triggered by policies to promote the econ-
omy was corrected by cutting the possibilities to re-
ceive public aid. However, not only investment but
also research and development in the new Laender
still receive substantial subsidies.Besides the obvious
misallocation of scarce resources, this has also led to
inefficiencies in the production process (DIW et al.
2003).A further possible consequence was a habitu-
ation effect (for the provider of aid as well as for the
recipient). In this respect, the assessment of the im-
pact of public support policies is rather ambivalent.
To be sure, without measures to promote the econo-
my,the development in eastern Germany would have
been even less favorable.Due to rather adverse con-
ditions regarding location (especially concerning in-
frastructure) not many investors would have put their
money into the new Laender, if there had not been
appropriate incentives. So it is not the fact of pro-
moting subsidies as such that has to be regarded crit-
ically, but their implementation.
Furthermore,the proven and tested western German
socio-political instruments were transferred to east-
ern Germany to support the radical change in the new
Laender: early retirement of older workers (as a re-
duction of labor supply), granting of short-term al-
lowances (as a substitute for open unemployment),
job-creating measures of different kinds (as a socio-
politically motivated provision of alternative em-
ployment, as a bridge into the first labor market and
for the fulfillment of social tasks), qualification pro-
grams and other measures. In retrospect, these in-
struments of the “second labour market”also have to
be regarded critically, as the intended reintegration
of participants into regular employment was not re-
ally successful (on the contrary,often it became more
difficult).Partly,habituation effects of the persons af-
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4 See SÖSTRA (2009),p.103.Another 29 percent of companies fol-
low collective labor agreements without having entered a commit-
ment to comply.
5 Information from the WSI-Tarifarchiv:http://www.boeckler.de/
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fected were the result, which weakened their ability
to be pro-active. Also, negative effects on the com-
petitive situation on the local labor markets could not
be avoided. It was only with the general re-orienta-
tion of the labour market policy in the course of the
so-called “Agenda 2010” (as of 2003) that these defi-
ciencies were slowly corrected.
The interaction of the described measures and deci-
sions set the scene for the economic development in
eastern Germany after reunification – thereby, al-
ternative development processes were rendered im-
possible or made at least very difficult. The bigger
part of the problems that eastern Germany has to
deal with today has to be understood as the result of
the after-effects of the GDR and as a result of the
political decisions taken during the transformation
processes in the new Laender. The institutional
change of the command economy in the GDR into
a free market economy was accomplished quickly;
for the effective adaptation much more time is need-
ed. However, this means that special measures are
still necessary to support the economic reconstruc-
tion of the east.
Political consequences: a 10-point agenda for the
new Laender
The poor economic power in the new Laender on the
one hand and the dissatisfactory labor market situa-
tion are – from a political point of view – not accept-
able.After all,the German constitution,article 72,sec-
tion 2 requires the establishment of “equal living con-
ditions” throughout the federal territory. Despite the
indeterminacy of the term (Barloesius 2006),it is clear
that this aim has not yet been achieved.Furthermore,
the continuing gap between eastern and western
Germany constitutes a social problem that can lead to
disenchantment with the political order and to anti-
democratic tendencies. Hence, in the new Laender
there is a continued need for special measures.
The selection of adequate measures has to take place
against the background of current and future re-
strictions for stronger economic growth in the new
Laender.In this context it is essential to consider the
demographic development: already between 1989
and 1999 the population in the area of the former
GDR (new Laender and eastern Berlin) shrank by
1.3 million people (–8 percent);since then the decline
in population has continued almost at full speed (in
eastern Germany,including Berlin:–775,000 people;
–4,5 percent).Responsible for the decline in popula-
tion are – in equal parts – the net emigration (balance
of migration 2001–07:–309,000 people) and the birth
deficit (balance of natural population development
2001–07: –374,000 people). Two implications arise
from an economic perspective:on the one hand,due
to the selective migration flows – especially young
and well qualified-people migrate to West Germany
– the human capital situation deteriorates. On the
other hand, due to the above-average decline in the
number of the working-age population – the subse-
quent cohorts are quantitatively smaller than the co-
horts that are going into retirement.A general short-
age of the labor force is the result.Since this process
will continue in the next few years, the growth fore-
cast for the new Laender,especially in the peripher-
al regions with above-average demographic decline
(Ragnitz 2007) – is worsening.There is the risk of a
gradual depletion – a “passive reconstruction”, as it
were. Additionally, with a declining population, the
demand for “non-tradable goods” is expected to go
down. This will also have a negative effect on eco-
nomic perspectives.
The second negative factor for the future economic
development in eastern Germany is an apparent nar-
rowing of the fiscal scope. The so-called “Solidarity
Pact II”,which regulates the above-average financial
support in favor of the new Laender will expire in
2019; furthermore, from 2013 on, the EU subsidies
will gradually come to an end. As a result, not only
the existing supporting preferences for the new
Laender will have to be phased out.The eastern Ger-
man Laender and local administrations will be forced
to make cutbacks in their spending,which at the mo-
ment is 20 percent above the per-capita-level of the
financially weak western German states, slowing
down the overall economic development further.
Finally,there is also the risk that already existing pro-
duction capacities in the new Laender will not re-
main there permanently. Especially in the industrial
sector  “extended workbenches” prevail, which do
not often form close ties in the region and are de-
pendent on globally operating affiliated conglomer-
ates. It is possible that these will be affected by pro-
duction relocation,when the plants built in the 1990s
are technologically out-of-date and written off en-
tirely. Only in a few sectors and fields of technology
– those still at the beginning of the production cycle
(examples are the opto-electronic industry or the
manufacture of equipment for producing renewable
energies) – were the new Laender successful in at-tracting internationally operating companies.6 How-
ever,their quantitative importance is too small in or-
der to actually compensate for possible shrinkage
tendencies in other sectors.
The still existing income gap between eastern and
western Germany is partly a reflection of the different
locational conditions in the two parts of the country
and therefore probably also have to be accepted in the
long run (Ragnitz 2009).To some extent,however,this
also mirrors the after-effects of the transformation
process, which are in danger of becoming permanent.
Should this be the case, there will still be the need for
(special) efforts to “accelerate” the economic recon-
struction of the east.Against this background 10 points
are listed below,which can provide new momentum to
the reconstruction program in the east:7
1. Support of the implementation of regional devel-
opment concepts through global allocation of
funds: Due to the growing differentiation of the
economic development in the new Laender, re-
gional development strategies are gaining impor-
tance.These have to differ according to local con-
ditions and should also take into account regional
preferences in an appropriate manner. Accord-
ingly, a mere orientation to the western German
model is not appropriate. Such concepts can only
be properly implemented by the respective local
players. In order to support this, the federal and
state governments should provide the appropriate
financial funds; of course the use of the funds has
to be carefully monitored.The InnoRegio compe-
tition, which in its core focuses on a lasting mobi-
lization of the regional players, could be a role
model (DIW 2004).
2. Reorientation of investment promotion: In future,
investment promotion should be used primarily as
an instrument of settling policy – being limited to
new investments that can plausibly point to alter-
native locations outside the new Laender. It
should be possible to transfer funds that are not
spent in one year to the next year(s).It also makes
sense not to link the amount of funding to the
amount to be invested but to the number of jobs
created, in order to avoid excessive capital inten-
sification of production. However, a sectoral con-
centration on supposed “future fields” is not rec-
ommended,because this would lead to significant
distortions and in the worst case scenario would
not be sustainable anyway.An “industrial policy”
of this sort makes sense on the federal level but
certainly not on regional or state level.
3. Reinforcement of innovation: General economic
support with the aim to “maintain” industries
should be redirected to innovation activities in the
companies.This would result in improving the ex-
port performance of eastern German firms.Given
the difficulties in selecting projects that deserve
support, the policy instruments should be as tech-
nologically neutral as possible – for example by
implementing a general tax relief for innovation
expenditures (Expertenkommission Forschung
und Innovation 2008, 32ff).
4. Improvement of enterprise start-up promotion: Due
to unresolved difficulties in finding successors, the
new Laender face the threat of an entrepreneurial
gap; at the same time the public image of “the en-
trepreneur”is still colored by prejudices.Besides in-
creased information and education, active encour-
agement for the creation of new businesses and
takeovers is required.To achieve this,potential com-
pany founders with a lack of financial resources
could be provided with capital (i.e., via long-term
subordinated loans),which does not necessarily have
to be subsidized.Also,certain sectors of the popula-
tion that in the past were not active in setting up their
own businesses (women,unemployed persons,older
persons in employment) could be encouraged to be-
come entrepreneurs. The focus of attention should
also (and more than in the past) concentrate on the
future viability of proposed new businesses.
5. Removal of existing infrastructural deficits:Although
the standard of the infrastructure in the new
Laender is generally high,there are still bottlenecks
in some parts; for example with regards to interna-
tional traffic to Poland and the Czech Republic or
with regards to gaps in the long-distance road and
rail networks. Keeping in mind the aim of an im-
proved integration of the eastern German Laender
in the international division of labour, these gaps
should be closed as quickly as possible. In the area
of research infrastructure (universities and non-uni-
versity research institutions), a better compatibility
with existing industrial structures should be en-
couraged – especially with a view to the need for
skilled personnel and technological transfer.
6. Solving the problem of the impending shortage of
skilled labor through improved education and train-
ing: Not least because of the demographic devel-
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growth”, see, e.g., HIERO (2008).
7Even though there is a discussion of alternative development goals
for the new Laender, in the following it is assumed that an (ap-
proximate) equalization of living standards in eastern and western
Germany on the basis of the western German economic and social
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opment,there will be a noticeable shortage of high-
ly-qualified, well-trained professionals in the new
Laender in a few years.At the same time, the un-
employment rate of persons with low qualifications
and no training is expected to remain high.This is
due to the fact that the reduction of the labour sup-
ply is matched by a reduced demand for labour
(Ragnitz et al. 2007). This is an argument for in-
creased qualification efforts, including further
training for persons already in employment.The is-
sue here is not only the provision of public funds,
but also an improvement in the quality of the ex-
isting further education and training schemes.
7. Accepting the demographic challenge: Population
shrinkage and ageing in eastern Germany cannot
be stopped. What is needed are adaptation mea-
sures for the demographic change.This includes a
review of all political measures with regards to
their demographic suitability.Additionally, incen-
tives for settlement structures closer to agglomer-
ation centers should be offered and public services
of general interest in regions with shrinking pop-
ulation be reduced to a basic level while, at the
same time,providing more freedom for self-initia-
tive projects.
8. Opening up options for regional-specific regula-
tions: Deregulation is a perennial problem in the
discussion about the reconstruction of eastern
Germany.Even though it is not easy to make spe-
cific proposals, the legislative sovereignty should
be transferred back to the Laender in all the cas-
es where a legitimate interest in a federal regula-
tion cannot be demonstrated. If necessary, more
extensive use could be made of the possibility to
deviate – for a limited amount of time – from fed-
eral law.
9. Improving links with Central and Eastern European
countries: Poland and the Czech Republic and oth-
er Central and Eastern European countries are,due
to their geographic proximity, virtually “natural”
target countries for the international activities of
eastern German firms.Besides the trade with goods
and services,cooperations especially in production
as well as in research and development should be
pursued.Furthermore,a stronger integration of the
regional labour markets on both sides of the bor-
der can be beneficial. So far, the existing potential
in this area has not been fully used. This is partly
due to mental barriers as well as due to lack of lan-
guage skills. Here we find various points of depar-
ture for politicians to take.
10.Strengthening overall German economic growth:
Eastern Germany will most likely be able to close
the gap to western Germany if the economic de-
velopment in the whole of Germany gains mo-
mentum. This will not only improve sales oppor-
tunities for eastern German firms but also more
money will be invested, with the result that loca-
tions in the new Laender could increasingly come
into focus for western German enterprises.Thus it
is necessary to look beyond the current economic
and financial crisis for new ways to accelerate
overall German growth rates.
Needless to say, these 10 points, which were only
touched on here, are not exhaustive. However, it is
above all important to realize that a policy of “busi-
ness as usual” and a restriction to only all-German
measures would not solve the problems in eastern
Germany.It would also be wrong to refer all respon-
sibility to the authorities of the eastern German
Laender. Unless a self-supporting development can
be triggered in eastern Germany, the need for finan-
cial help in the new Laender (besides the federal fis-
cal compensation scheme) will continue. This con-
cerns especially social security expenditures and will
also have an impact on the development in the west.
In this respect, the federal government also has to
show commitment in the new Laender beyond that
made in the Solidarity Pact II.
Is it realistic to expect eastern Germany to reach at
least the level of the financially weak western German
Laender by 2020? Without additional political efforts
chances are not good, at least not as good as the fed-
eral government would have us believe.At the begin-
ning of a new legislative period this should be seen as
an opportunity to stop and think about measures
which could help to achieve this “elusive” aim.
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